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Abstract
In logical reasoning, it is often the case that only some of a collection of assumptions are
needed to reach a conclusion. A strengthening lemma is an assertion that a given conclusion
is independent in this sense of a particular assumption. Strengthening lemmas underlie
many useful techniques for simplifying proofs in automated and interactive theorem-provers.
For example, they underlie a mechanism called subordination that is useful in determining
that expressions of a particular type cannot contain objects of another type and in thereby
reducing the number of cases to be considered in proving universally quantified statements.
This thesis concerns the automation of the proofs of strengthening lemmas in a specifica-
tion logic called the logic of hereditary Harrop formulas (HOHH). The Abella Proof Assistant
embeds this logic in a way that allows it to prove properties of both the logic itself and of
specifications written in it. Previous research has articulated a (conservative) algorithm for
checking if a claimed strengthening lemma is, in fact, true. We provide here an implemen-
tation of this algorithm within the setting of Abella. Moreover, we show how to generate
an actual proof of the strengthening lemma in Abella from the information computed by
the algorithm; such a proof serves as a more trustworthy certificate of the correctness of the
lemma than the algorithm itself. The results of this work have been incorporated into the
Abella system in the form of a “tactic command” that can be invoked within the interac-
tive theorem-prover and that will result in an elaboration of a proof of the lemma and its
incorporation into the collection of proven facts about a given specification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A strengthening lemma is a logical statement that any proof of a given statement is inde-
pendent of some of the available assumptions. Such lemmas have many uses in the context
of automated and interactive theorem-provers. This thesis considers the generation of the
proofs of such lemmas without human assistance. The idea that underlies the determination
of the truth of such lemmas is to state: A conclusion C is independent of an assumption
F if an analysis of the structure of proofs will show that F cannot figure in a proof of C.
We describe how such an analysis can be carried out within a specification logic called the
logic of hereditary Harrop formulas that is useful in formalizing rule-based descriptions of a
variety of computational systems. We also discuss how such an analysis can be expanded
into an actual proof of the relevant strengthening lemma.
It is perhaps useful to consider an example of the method we use before we get into a
detailed description of our specification logic and the automation of strengthening lemmas
concerning it. Suppose that we want to define a predicate called list minus that holds between
two lists and an element just in the case that the second list is the result of removing the given
element from the first list. This relation can be defined by the following logical formulas:
∀X∀L list minus X (X :: L) L
∀X∀Y ∀L∀L′ (list minus X L L′ ⊃ list minus X (Y :: L) (Y :: L′))
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It should be intuitively clear how a formula of the form list minus X L1 L2, where X , L1, and
L2 represent particular values, would have to be proved based on this definition: we have
either to show that our “goal” is an instance of the first formula or that it matches with the
righthand side of an instance of the second formula and whose lefthand side is provable by a
similar process. This procedure is, in fact, the way in which derivations are constructed in
the logic of Horn clauses that underlies logic programming languages like Prolog.
Now, suppose that our assumption set includes formulas for another predicate called
append that expresses the fact that three lists are in the “append” relation. Clearly, the
procedure that we have described for proving list minus X L1 L2 has no use for these ad-
ditional formulas and would therefore succeed or fail independently of their existence in the
collection of assumptions. Thus we can say that the assertion that a proof exists for the given
conclusion from an assumption set containing the definition of append can be strengthened
to an assertion that such a proof exists even if the formulas for append are dropped.
The idea that we have outlined above corresponds to a kind of reachability analysis
over formulas based on a derivation relation for a given logic. An algorithm for conducting
such a reachability analysis for the HOHH logic has been described in [6]. This thesis
implements this algorithm and it then uses this implementation to generate explicit proofs
for the strengthening lemmas that are validated by the algorithm. To prove such lemmas
explicitly, it uses the Abella Proof Assistant that encodes the HOHH logic and is capable
of proving meta-theorems about it. The end result of this work is a new “tactic command”
that can be invoked in the Abella system to check and then automatically generate proofs
for strengthening lemmas about HOHH specifications.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the HOHH specification
logic and give examples of how this language can be used to encode rule-based systems.
Chapter 3 provides the background calculations necessary to generate strengthening lemmas
correctly. Chapter 4 describes the Abella Proof Assistant and its use, as well as giving an
example of proving a property of a specification written in the specification language. We
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finish with Chapter 5, which describes the automatic generation of strengthening lemmas
and the supporting theorems, as well as the aforementioned new “tactic command”.
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Chapter 2
Formalizing Relational Specifications
In this chapter we describe the logic of higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas (HOHH),
the logic in whose context we will consider automatically proving strengthening lemmas. The
interest in this logic arises from the fact that it is well-suited to formalizing and prototyping
software systems that are described in a rule-based fashion. Indeed, HOHH provides the
basis for the λProlog programming language [3] that has been implemented, for example, in
the Teyjus system [5] and has been used for exactly these purposes in many applications.
The strengthening lemmas that we want to prove turn out to be useful in reasoning about
the λProlog programs that result from this process, an activity that can be carried out using
the Abella Proof Assistant.
The first section below presents the HOHH logic through its formulas and its proof
relation; the syntax of this logic is based on the simply-typed λ-calculus that we digress
briefly to also describe. We then motivate the usefulness of HOHH in encoding rule-based
relational specifications. In preparation for a description of the real technical content of
this thesis, the concluding section of the chapter explains what is meant by a strengthening
lemma in the context of the HOHH logic.
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2.1 Higher-Order Hereditary Harrop Formulas
In this section we describe the syntax and the inference rules that define the logic of higher-
order hereditary Harrop formulas and we also discuss some metatheoretic properties of this
logic that we will find use for later. We use a somewhat simplified syntax for the formulas
in the logic from what is supported in the λProlog language. We do this to simplify the
exposition and we note that nothing essential to the discussion is lost in the process.
2.1.1 The Underlying Language
The syntax of HOHH is based on the simply-typed λ-calculus [2]. Two categories of expres-
sions define the language: types and terms. The types are built from atomic types, which
include built-in types and user-defined atomic types. For example, to work with binary trees
containing natural numbers, a user might define types nat to represent natural numbers and
bt to represent binary trees. Higher-order types may be built using the → type construc-
tor, which takes two types and creates a new type. For example, σ → τ is the type of a
function whose domain is the type σ and whose co-domain is the type τ . The → construc-
tor is right-associative, so the type (σ1 → (σ2 → (... → (σn → τ)...))) can be written as
σ1 → σ2 → ...→ σn → τ .
The basis for the terms of the simply-typed λ-calculus (λ-terms or simply terms) are a
countably-infinite set of variable symbols V and a countably-infinite set of constant symbols
C. Each member of these sets is identified with a type. A member of either of these sets is
a λ-term by itself. We can then build larger terms using abstraction and application. An
abstraction of the variable x over a term t, written λx.t, represents a function where a term
may be given as an argument to produce a new term. An application of a term t1 to a term
t2, written (t1 t2), represents function application. Repeated application is left-associative,
and so we can write (...(t1 t2)...tn) as t1 t2 ...tn.
Not all the terms that can be constructed in the manner described above are considered
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c : τ ∈ Σ
const var
Σ ⊢ c : τ
Σ ⊢ t1 : σ → τ Σ ⊢ t2 : σ app
Σ ⊢ (t1 t2) : τ
x : σ ∈ Σ Σ ⊢ t : τ
abs
Σ ⊢ λx.t : σ → τ
Figure 2.1: The typing rules for the simply-typed λ-calculus, where Σ is a context assigning types to constants
and variables, and ⊢ represents the derivation of a type from the context Σ.
well-formed. To be deemed well-formed, it must also be possible to assign a type to the
term. The rules for determining the types can be seen in Figure 2.1. We assume here that
Σ is a context that indicates the assigned types for constants and variables. From these we
get the rule for typing constants and variables, which is simply that they must be identified
in Σ and that they then have the type assigned to them. To type an abstraction λx.t with
the type σ → τ for some types σ and τ , the variable x must have type σ and t must have
the type τ . To show that an application (t1 t2) has some type τ , we show that t1 has the
type σ → τ for some type σ and that t2 is of type σ.
In the discussions below we will need a substitution operation on terms. If x is a variable,
t2 is a term of the same type as x, and t1 is a term, we will denote the substitution of t2 for
x in t1 by t1[t2/x]. Since abstractions in the terms represent a binding operation, we have to
be careful about how such a substitution is defined. One requirement is that we must not
substitute for bound variables: specifically, if t1 is λx.t
′
1, then t1[t2/x] must be t1, i.e. the
substitution must leave the term unchanged. Another requirement is that free variables in
the term being substituted must not end up being captured by an abstraction in the term
being substituted into: thus, if t1 is λy.t
′
1 for some y different from x and y appears free in t2,
then we must change t1 to use a name that is different from y and that does not appear in t2
and only then proceed to substituting t2 in the body of the abstraction. We will not present
this substitution operation in detail here, assuming instead that the reader can construct a
definition for it based on our description of the main difficulties that have to be accounted
for.
Equality of terms is important in the logic used. The three important pieces of the
equality relationship between terms are β-conversion, η-conversion, and α-conversion. β-
7
conversion involves terms with subterms of the form ((λx.t1) t2), called a β-redex. The
β-redex can be replaced with t1[t2/x] in β-contraction. Conversely, a term can be expanded
to this form in β-expansion. η-conversion involves terms with subterms of the form λx.(t x),
where x does not occur free in t. This is called an η-redex. η-contraction is replacing this
term with t, while η-expansion is replacing a term with a function type by an η-redex by
wrapping it in an abstraction. The final piece is α-conversion. Terms include names for
bound variables, but these names do not matter in themselves; the terms λx.x and λy.y
both refer to the identity function, but are not exactly the same by variable names and so
are not seen as equal. To show their equality, α-conversion is used to rename variables. For
the terms λx.t1 and λy.t2, a new variable z is chosen that is free in both t1 and t2. The
original terms are then replaced by λz.t1[z/x] and λz.t2[z/y]. By renaming variables in this
way, two terms with the same structure that had different variable names can be seen to be
the same.
It is possible to β-contract and η-contract a term to a point where these cannot be applied
anymore, which is called the βη-normal form of a term. Two terms can be contracted to
their unique βη-normal forms, then α-conversion can be used to give them the same names
for bound variables. If they are equal after this, the two original terms are equivalent.
To build a logic based on the simply-typed λ-calculus, we first identify a special atomic
type o that will function as the type of logical formulas. We then add several logical constants:
⇒: o → o → o, representing implication; &: o → o → o, representing conjunction; ⊤: o,
representing truth; ⊥: o, representing falsity; and Πτ : (τ → o) → o, representing universal
quantification over the type τ . The constant Π stands for an infinite set of constants,
with a different one for each type τ . We will usually not include the type subscript when
writing quantifications. Logical formulas are then built using these constants and user-
defined predicates.
We can construct a logic over the language we have described by introducing rules cor-
responding to each of the logical constants that allow us to construct proofs for formulas.
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In a fully configured logic, we would not place any restrictions on the forms of the formulas
we want to derive. The HOHH logic takes a different view: it limits the kinds of formulas
permitted with a goal of allowing specialized inference rules that are motivated by the desire
to construct derivations that parallel those in rule-based systems. More specifically, this
logic is concerned with two classes of formulas that are called goal formulas and program
clauses. These formulas are described by the following syntax rules in which goal formulas
and program clauses are denoted by G and D respectively:
G ::= ⊤ | Ar | G & G | D ⇒ G | Πτx.G
D ::= G⇒ Ar | Πτx.D
In these rules, we take Ar to represent a formula whose leftmost non-parenthesis symbol is a
predicate constant different from the logical constants. A formula of this kind is also referred
to as a rigid atom. To write multiple universal quantifications for variables x1, x2, ..., xn with
corresponding types τ1, τ2, ..., τn, we write Πx¯ : τ¯ .
In the context of the HOHH logic, we think of a collection of program clauses as a
specification or program. In later discussions, we will need to refer to the atom A in a
formula F of the form Πx¯ : τ¯ .G⇒ A as the head of F , written H(F ). Further, we will call
the predicate head of A, i.e. the leftmost non-parenthesis symbol in A, the head predicate
of F as well and we will use the notation Hp(F ) to refer to it. Finally, we have the body of
G, a goal formula, written L(G). If G is an implication D ⇒ G′, L(G) = {D}; otherwise,
L(G) = ∅.
2.1.2 The Specification Logic
In Figure 2.2, we see the inference rules of HOHH. These rules are oriented around proving
judgments of the form Σ; Γ;∆ ⊢ G that are called sequents. In such a sequent, Σ is a
signature that contains the constants that appear in the sequent with each constant being
paired with its type, Γ is a set of program clauses that is referred to as the static context
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Goal-
Reduction
⊤R
Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ ⊤
Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ G1 Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ G2
&R
Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ G1&G2
Σ;Γ;∆, D ⊢ G
⇒R
Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ D ⇒ G
c /∈ Σ Σ, c : τ ; Γ;∆ ⊢ B[c/x]
ΠR
Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ ΠτxB
Backchaining Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ G Σ;Γ;∆; [A] ⊢ A ⇒L
Σ;Γ;∆; [G⇒ A] ⊢ A
Σ ⊢ t : τ Σ;Γ;∆; [F t] ⊢ A
ΠL
Σ;Γ;∆; [ΠτF ] ⊢ A
Structural initΣ;Γ;∆; [A] ⊢ A
D ∈ Γ ∪∆ Σ;Γ;∆; [D] ⊢ A
focus
Σ;Γ;∆ ⊢ A
Figure 2.2: The inference rules of HOHH, where Σ contains type assignments and Γ and ∆ are sets of clauses
to be used in proving the goal. In the &R rule, i is either 1 or 2.
of the sequent, and ∆ is another set of program clauses that is referred to as the dynamic
context of the sequent. Intuitively, such a sequent asserts that the formula G, also called the
goal formula of the sequent, holds whenever the program clauses in Γ and ∆ hold. Initially,
∆ is an empty set, G is the formula we want to show holds, and Γ is a specification in whose
context we want to show G holds; Σ is set assigning types to the collection of constants
appearing in Γ and G. When searching for a proof of such a sequent, we first simplify the
goal formula using the pertinent goal-reduction rule. In the course of using these rules, we
may add new constants to Σ through applications of the ΠR rule and new formulas to the
dynamic context through applications of the⇒R rule. When this formula has been reduced
to an atomic one, the search switches to a backchaining mode. This begins with our first
selecting a program clause from Γ or ∆ using the focus rule. This rule introduces a sequent of
the form Σ; Γ;∆; [D] ⊢ A that has the same assertional content as our regular sequents with
the exception that it also signals our intent to work with a particular program clause—called
the focus—in looking for a proof. The backchaining rules are used to further this intent.
The ⇒L rule may spawn an attempt to prove the goal formula that constitutes the “body”
of the chosen clause and success in using the program clause depends on our being able to
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match the head of an instance of the program clause with the atomic goal formula using the
init rule.
2.1.3 Metatheoretic Properties of the Logic
It has been shown that the derivation system of HOHH corresponds to provability in intu-
itionistic logic [4]. Thus, any sequent of the kind we are considering has a derivation in this
system if and only if it is valid in intuitionistic logic. Then any metatheoretic properties of
intuitionistic logic, when limited to considering sequents with only program clauses and goal
formulas in the relevant places, also apply to this derivation system, and we can think of
using them in constructing HOHH derivations.
One such property is instantiation, which is if Σ ⊢ t : τ and Σ, c : τ ; Γ;∆ ⊢ G where c is
not free in Γ are derivable, then it is also possible to derive Σ; Γ;∆[t/c] ⊢ G[t/c], where we
allow [t/c] to be the capture-avoiding substitution of t for c in a formula or set of formulas.
More simply, if t has type τ , then a derivation that includes a constant of this type that is
not found in the static context is also valid if t is used in the constant’s place.
The monotonicity property of intuitionistic derivability states that if Σ; Γ;∆ ⊢ G is
derivable and F ∈ ∆ implies F ∈ Θ, then Σ; Γ;Θ ⊢ G also derivable. From this, it follows
that if we have succeeded in proving a sequent with multiple copies of a formula in the
dynamic context, then a sequent in which we remove one of the copies will still be derivable.
This metatheoretic property is a special case of a more general property known as the
admissibility of contraction. Similarly, it follows that adding formulas to the dynamic context
of a derivable sequent yields another sequent that is derivable. This property is a special
case of a property known as the admissibility of weakening.
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2.2 Encoding Rule-Based Systems
Many notions that are of interest in a computational setting can be described via relations
that are presented in a rule-based fashion. As an example, consider the task of appending
two lists to produce a third. We can capture the intent of this computation through a
relation between three lists. Moreover, we can describe this relation completely by saying
that it holds if and only if it can be derived using the following rules:
app-nil
append nil L L
append L1 L2 L3 app-cons
append (X :: L1) L2 (X :: L3)
To understand that these rules are a complete description of the relation, we note that this
is a definition that is inductive on the structure of the first argument of append. Note also
that in the usual interpretation, we intend rules such as these to be interpreted not only as
a means for deriving the append relation but also as the only means for doing so.
These rules can be encoded in HOHH using program clauses. We will assume an encoding
of the natural numbers in a type nat, which will be the type of elements in the lists being
appended. We will also assume an encoding of type list, with constructors nil : list and
cons : nat → list → list, with nil representing the empty list and cons representing list
construction. A predicate symbol append : list → list → list → o is created to represent the
append relationship. Then the rules as shown above can be translated to program clauses
as follows:
append nil L L append L1 L2 L3 ⇒ append (cons X L1) L2 (cons X L3)
We use the logic programming convention that the variables that start with capital letters
are universally quantified over the whole formula.
Using these two program clauses, we can determine whether the append relation holds
between three lists l1, l2, and l3. To do so, the three lists are encoded into the list type,
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then we try to prove the sequent Σ; Γ; ∅ ⊢ append l1 l2 l3, where Σ contains the constants
for building lists and the append predicate, and Γ contains the program clauses containing
the rules for append. Clearly the rules and program clauses are equivalent, and carrying out
this derivation would also follow the same structure as using the rules. Then the behavior
of the rule-based append is the same as is captured in the program clauses for append.
Another example of a rule-based specification is assigning types to terms in the simply-
typed λ-calculus. The typing relationship to be defined is Γ ⊢ t : τ , where t is a term of
type τ and Γ is a typing context that has the form x1 : τ1, ..., xn : τn for distinct variables
x1, ..., xn of types τ1, ..., τn. The typing rules are as follows:
x : τ ∈ Γ varTy
Γ ⊢ x : τ
Γ ⊢ t1 : σ → τ Γ ⊢ t2 : σ appTy
Γ ⊢ (t1 t2) : τ
Γ, x : σ ⊢ t : τ
absTy
Γ ⊢ λx.t : σ → τ
We create an encoding of types and terms, with the encoding of types having type ty and
the encoding of terms having type tm. Atomic types are represented by b : ty, and we have
the arrow type constructor arr : ty → ty → ty to represent function types. Terms are encoded
by app : tm → tm → tm for application and abs : ty → (tm → tm) → tm for abstraction.
In the abstraction encoding, we allow the abstraction available in the underlying logic used
for encoding to handle the binding for us. Doing this allows us to allow the underlying
logic to handle the scoping of bindings and the substitution of terms in an object-language
term. As an example of the encoding, the term (λ(x : b).λ(y : (b → b)).y x) is encoded as
abs b (λx.abs (arr b b) (λy.app y x)).
We create a predicate typeof : tm→ ty → o to represent the typing relation. The typing
context will be held in the dynamic context in derivations, so it need not be included in the
predicate. Then the typing rules are
typeof M1 (arr T1 T2)⇒ typeof M2 T1 ⇒ typeof (app M1 M2) T2
(Πx.(typeof x T1 ⇒ typeof (M x) T2))⇒ typeof (abs T1 M) (arr T1 T2)
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We assume that any variables starting with capital letters are implicitly universally quan-
tified over the whole formula. Then showing that the typing relation Γ ⊢ M : τ holds, we
show that the sequent Σ; Γ; ∅ ⊢ typeof M¯ τ¯ is derivable, where Σ contains the constants
for creating terms and types, along with the typeof predicate, Γ contains the two program
clauses defining the typeof predicate, and M¯ and τ¯ represent the encodings of M and τ .
Consider the derivation of typeof (abs b λx.x) (arr b b). We start with an atomic goal, so
the goal-reduction rules do not need to be used. Then the derivation is started by focusing
on the program clause for typing abstractions. After instantiating the universally-quantified
variables to match the goal, we see that the formula we are focusing on is
Πx.(typeof x b⇒ typeof x b)⇒ typeof (abs b λx.x) (arr b b)
We then use the ⇒ L rule to reduce the focused formula to atomic form. This splits the
derivation, as we have both to prove the current goal focused on the head formula and the
antecedent. The current goal matches the head formula of the focused formula, and is then
proved immediately by the init rule.
Our other derivation to be completed is that of
Σ; Γ; ∅ ⊢ Πx.(typeof x b⇒ typeof x b)
The ΠR rule is used to introduce a new constant that is added to the signature. Since the
top-level logical connective on the right is now an implication, the⇒R rule is used to reduce
it to its head, giving us the sequent
Σ, x : tm; Γ; typeof x b ⊢ typeof x b
In this way typeof x b is added to the dynamic context, saving the assumption of the type
of the variable x for use in the remainder of the derivation. This obviates tracking these
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assumptions in the typeof predicate itself. By focusing on the formula in the dynamic context,
we are able to use the init rule, finishing this branch of the derivation as well. Since both
branches are completed, the whole derivation is completed, and the original goal has been
proven.
2.3 Strengthening Lemmas
Our interest in this thesis is in strengthening lemmas in the context of the HOHH logic.
These lemmas take the following form: Suppose we know that Σ; Γ;∆, F ⊢ G is derivable.
Moreover, suppose that we can determine that F could not possibly have been used in this
derivation. Then we can conclude that the sequent Σ; Γ;∆ ⊢ G must also have a derivation.
A critical part of the reasoning described above is showing that the assumption F that
we want to “discard” could not figure in the derivation of G. To do this, we find all the
possible forms of goals which may arise in proving G, and all formulas that may occur in the
context while proving G, and show that F cannot be used for any of the goals or by using
any of the formulas that may occur in the context. The methods for finding all formulas
that may be in the context and all possible goals are described in the next chapter. Here we
limit ourselves to discussing some of the issues that must be considered in designing such a
method.
As a small example, consider the sequent Σ; ∅;F ⇒ G,F ⊢ G. Clearly, by focusing and
backchaining on the first formula in the context, the sequent becomes Σ; ∅;F ⇒ G,F ⊢ F ,
so in this case G cannot be strengthened from F . Another, more subtle, example of when
strengthening fails is the sequent Σ; ∅;F ⇒ A,A⇒ G,F ⊢ G. By focusing and backchaining
on A⇒ G, the goal formula becomes A, from which it is possible to focus and backchain on
F ⇒ A, once again giving a goal of F , which can be solved by the F in the context. Then it
should be clear why considering all goals that may arise in the course of computation, rather
than just the original goal, is important.
15
If we consider the sequent Σ; ∅;F ⇒ B, (B ⇒ A) ⇒ G,A, F ⊢ G, we can see that
strengthening from F is possible. The only action available to start is to focus and backchain
on (B ⇒ A)⇒ G, which gives a goal of B ⇒ A. Using the ⇒R rule, we get the goal A and
the formula B is added to the context. This is then solved by focusing and backchaining
on its instance in the context. It can be seen that F can never become a goal in the
derivation of the original sequent, since that would require backchaining with a goal of B.
Since F can never become a goal, we are able to strengthen from F to get the sequent
Σ; ∅;F ⇒ B, (B ⇒ A) ⇒ G,A ⊢ G. Similarly, since B can never become a goal, it is also
possible to strengthen from F ⇒ B, giving the sequent Σ; ∅; (B ⇒ A)⇒ G,A ⊢ G.
An example of the use of strengthening is type independence. If we have two types, τ1
and τ2, then τ2 is independent of τ1 if, whenever the typing judgment Σ, x : τ1 ⊢ t : τ2 holds,
Σ ⊢ t : τ2 also holds. Type independence is less conservative than type subordination, as
discussed in [6], so we are able to more closely approximate which types a given type depends
on, allowing us to prune unnecessary dependencies.
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Chapter 3
Calculating Predicate Dependencies
Our ultimate goal is to show that some assumptions are unnecessary in proving a given goal.
To do this, we must determine what formulas may arise in the dynamic context during a
proof, along with determining what types of goals may arise in the course of any derivation. In
this chapter, we present the algorithms developed in [6] for computing both these sets. Using
the results of these algorithms, we are able to determine when a strengthening lemma holds.
Moreover, this information is also useful in developing an explicit proof of the strengthening
lemma, a task that we take up in Chapter 5.
3.1 Calculating Dynamic Contexts
We begin by considering the dynamic context of a predicate. If we have an implication as
our goal, then the ⇒R rule adds the antecedents of this goal to the context while reducing
the goal formula to the head of this formula. These antecedents are then available to be used
in proving the new goal, or any goal that further arises in the derivation. Using the ⇒ L
backchaining rule, we can get goal formulas with different head predicates. The new goal
then has the same context as the previous goal had. In this way, we find that the dynamic
context of one predicate may contain the dynamic context of another predicate.
In Figure 3.1 we see an algorithm for calculating constraints on the dynamic context
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Let Γ′ be a finite set equal to Γ and C ← ∅
while Γ′ 6= ∅ do
pick some D = (Πx¯.(G1 & ... & Gn)⇒ A) from Γ
′
add equations {C(Hp(Gi)) = C(Hp(Gi)) ∪ C(Hp(A)) ∪ L(Gi) | i = 1..n} to C
remove D from Γ′ and add clauses in
⋃
i∈1..nL(Gi) to Γ
′
end while
Figure 3.1: Algorithm for collecting constraints on dynamic contexts
of a predicate. We assume Γ is a finite set of program clauses. We let C(a) represent a
set of formulas that can occur in the dynamic context of the predicate a, that is, formulas
that may be in the dynamic context when the goal is G with Hp(G) = a, and C represent
the set of all constraint equations for all predicates. The only way we add formulas to
the context is through the ⇒ R rule, and this can happen with any formula currently in
the context with a head that matches the current goal’s head. To compute the set of
constraints, we go through every formula from Γ and their subformulas. For each formula
D = (Πx¯.(G1 & ... & Gn)⇒ A), we add a new constraint equation to C forHp(Gi) consisting
of the union of C(Hp(Gi)), C(Hp(A)), and L(Gi) for i = 1..n. We include the dynamic
context of Hp(A) because, when backchaining on D, the current goal’s head predicate must
be Hp(A), and so the formulas in the dynamic context of Hp(A) can also be in the dynamic
context for the derivations of Gi for i = 1..n. We include L(Gi) because, in reducing the
goal Gi to atomic form, all the formulas of the body will be moved into the dynamic context
by the ⇒ R rule. Since we have accounted for this formula, we remove it from further
consideration and add in the formulas from the bodies of all the antecedents to calculate
their effects on the dynamic contexts.
Once we have finished collecting the constraint equations, we need to iterate over the
constraint equations to find the full set of formulas that may occur in the dynamic context
of each predicate. We start with C(a) = ∅ for all a, where a is a predicate that occurs in Γ.
We repeatedly apply each of the constraint equations iteratively until no new formulas are
added to any dynamic context. At this point C(a) will be a set containing all the formulas
that the dynamic context may contain for each predicate a.
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Let S ← ∅
for all a ∈ ∆ do
for all D ∈ Γ ∪ C(a) where D = (Πx¯.(G1 & ... & Gn)⇒ A) and Hp(A) = a do
add (S(a) = S(a) ∪
⋃
i=1..n S(Hp(Gi))) to S
end for
end for
Figure 3.2: Algorithm for collecting constraints on dependencies
3.2 Calculating Predicate Dependencies
Once we know what formulas can occur in the dynamic contexts of predicates, we can
determine the dependencies between different predicates. To find the dependencies of a
predicate a, we look at the formulas that occur in both its dynamic context and the program
clauses, since these are the formulas it may focus and backchain on in the course of a
derivation. If a formula D = (Πx¯.(G1 & ... & Gn) ⇒ A) is used to backchain, then the
provability of the current goal, the head predicate of which is a, depends on the provability
of the head predicate of Gi for i = 1..n. Thus a depends on Hp(Gi), which may also depend
on other predicates. Then, since the provability of a depends on the provability of Hp(Gi),
the provability of which depends on a set of other predicates, a depends on these other
predicates as well.
The algorithm for computing constraints on dependencies is found in Figure 3.2. We
once again assume Γ is a set of program clauses. We let ∆ be the set of all predicates that
occur in Γ, S be a set of equations constraining the dependency relations, and S(a) be the
set of predicates a depends on, where a is a predicate. Then, for each of these predicates
p, we iterate over the full context that p may have, both the dynamic context and the
program clauses. For each formula D, if Hp(D) = p, a goal with p as its head predicate
could successfully backchain on it, and then all antecedents of D would have to be proven,
so we add a constraint equation for p that adds the dependencies of the head predicate for
each antecedent to the dependencies for p.
As in the case of calculating the dynamic contexts, we must iterate over the constraint
19
equations to find the full sets of dependencies. We start with S(a) = {a} for all a ∈ ∆, since
a predicate must depend on itself. We then iteratively apply the constraint equations in S
until no new predicates are added to any dependency set. Then we know that S(a) contains
all the dependencies of a, and, in the course of proving a goal G where Hp(G) = a, a goal
cannot arise with a head predicate that is not in S(a).
3.3 The Conservativity of Our Computations
The computations discussed in the first two sections of this chapter capture all possible for-
mulas that may occur in the dynamic context of a predicate and all predicates it may depend
on, but they may overestimate these dependencies. This occurs because the computations
don’t take into account the fact that some of the formulas do not occur in the same branch
of computation, and yet they are used together in calculating the dependencies.
Let us consider an example consisting of the sole formula
(((s⇒ r)⇒ p) & ((r ⇒ p)⇒ p))⇒ q
It is clear that if we are deriving Σ; Γ;∆ ⊢ q and backchain on this formula, we will have
two new goals to show, Σ; Γ;∆, s ⇒ r ⊢ p and Σ; Γ;∆, r ⇒ p ⊢ p. Then it is clear
that s ⇒ r and r ⇒ p both occur in the dynamic context of p, but they cannot occur
in the dynamic context at the same time. However, in computing the dependencies, these
branches are ignored and both are considered together. Then we get dependency constraint
equations S(r) = S(r) ∪ S(s) from s ⇒ r and S(p) = S(p) ∪ S(r) from r ⇒ p, as well as
S(q) = S(q)∪ S(p) ∪ S(p). Simplifying these to get the full calculated dependencies, we get
the following:
S(s) = {s}, S(r) = {r, s}, S(p) = {p, r, s}, S(q) = {q, p, r, s}
If we consider the goals we can have by focusing and backchaining in derivations start-
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ing with the goal q as above, however, we see that we have nothing to backchain on in
Σ; Γ;∆, s⇒ r ⊢ p, and we can only get Σ; Γ;∆, r ⇒ p ⊢ r from Σ; Γ;∆, r ⇒ p ⊢ p. Thus we
can see that the goal s cannot arise, and p, q, and r do not actually depend on s, but we
include it in our calculated dependencies for them.
The overestimation of dependencies is due to the inclusion together in the dynamic con-
text of formulas that would appear in different branches of the computation. It is important
to note that computing a larger set than will actually arise does not make our procedure for
determining when a strengthening lemma holds an unsound one: such a lemma will certainly
hold whenever the procedure says it does, an observation that follows from the metatheoretic
monotonicity property discussed in Subsection 2.1.3.. Rather, what it does is it sometimes
prevents us from providing a positive answer when in fact a more targeted analysis would
allow us to do so.
We could develop a more precise algorithm for calculating dependencies that overcomes
the specific issue highlighted by the example in this section. The way to deal with this is to
keep track of which type of branch is being taken to reach a certain goal and particularize
the sets to the relevant branches. In the prior example, we would need to track whether
we were carrying out the proof for ((s ⇒ r) ⇒ p) or ((r ⇒ p) ⇒ p). Then we could avoid
the issue of adding together contexts from different branches, and thus also avoid the issue
of overestimating the dependencies. We note that keeping track of the separate branches
would complicate the calculations of the sets. More importantly, it would also complicate
the process of proving the strengthening lemma, requiring many auxiliary strengthening
lemmas that are indexed not only by predicates but also by the branches in which we
are considering their derivation. We have not explored the description of a more precise
algorithm for calculating dependencies because we are not convinced at this stage that the
more complicated proof structure will be compensated for by the ability to prove more
strengthening lemmas automatically in practice.
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Chapter 4
The Abella Proof Assistant
Our goal now is to use the information that is computed by the algorithms described in
the previous chapter to produce explicit proofs of strengthening lemmas. We will construct
these proofs within the framework of the Abella Proof Assistant. The reason for our picking
this framework is twofold. First, Abella actually encodes the HOHH logic and provides us
a means for reasoning about derivations within it; thus, it is a framework within which we
are able to carry out the task that is of interest. Second, the strengthening lemmas that we
want to prove are often motivated by other proofs related to HOHH specifications that we
want to construct using the Abella system. This was, in fact, one of the original motivations
for considering these strengthening lemmas.
In this chapter we introduce the Abella Proof Assistant towards setting up a context
for describing the automatic generation of proofs for strengthening lemmas. We begin by
describing the logic that underlies Abella. We then explain the means Abella provides for
constructing proofs within this logic. In the last two sections, we present the encoding of the
HOHH logic within Abella and we explain how Abella allows us to reason about derivability
in the HOHH logic.
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4.1 The Logic Underlying Abella
The language used by the logic that Abella implements is also based on the simply typed λ-
calculus. The types used are determined in a similar fashion to that in the HOHH language.
Like in HOHH, there is a type for formulas with the difference that this type is named prop
rather than o. Once again, the language contains a special collection of logical constants
for constructing formulas. Specifically, these are ⊤ and ⊥, both of type prop; ∧, ∨, and
⊃ of type prop → prop → prop; ∀τ and ∃τ , both of type (τ → prop) → prop; and =τ ,
of type τ → τ → prop. The last three symbols, which represent universal quantification,
existential quantification, and equality, respectively, actually denote infinite sets of constants,
with a different constant for each type τ . We will generally drop the type subscript when
writing these symbols, assuming that their types can be inferred from the context. In writing
quantified formulas, we will abbreviate ∀ (λx.F ) by ∀x.F and similarly ∃ (λx.F ) by ∃x.F .
If we are quantifying multiple variables x1, ..., xn, we will write them as x¯. For example,
∀x1∀x2...∀xn may be written as ∀x¯.
The logic accords a special status to the various logical symbols that are part of the
language by including inference rules for interpreting assumptions and for deriving formulas
that contain them. The interpretation of the logical symbols other than = is similar to the
way we understand them in usual reasoning contexts. We will not present these rules explic-
itly, but will use them in understandable ways when we show derivations. The interpretation
of equality is one of the things that distinguishes Abella. The symbol = is assumed to have
a fixed meaning in the logic: it is treated as βη-convertibility. This interpretation does not
seem remarkable when it is applied to proving a formula with the equality symbol in it;
however, its unusual nature becomes clear when it is applied to an equality assumption. In
this case, we would need to examine the different ways in which the equality could hold
and show that the desired conclusion follows in all these cases. As a specific instance of the
use of this pattern of reasoning, assuming a and b to be two distinct constants, the formula
a = b ⊃ ⊥ is provable. This is because the two terms in the equality assumption are not
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βη-convertible.
Another unusual aspect of the logic underlying Abella is that it interprets atomic formulas
using fixed-point definitions. Such definitions are given by a collection of definitional clauses
that have the form ∀x¯.(A , B), where A is an atomic formula with variables bound by
x¯ and B is a formula. The atomic formula A is referred to as the head of the definition,
and B is the body. The interpretation of a fixed-point definition is that an atom A holds
if and only if A matches with the head of an instance of one of the clauses it contains and
the body of the corresponding clause holds. In writing clauses in Abella we typically leave
the universal quantifiers at the front implicit, showing the variables they quantify by using
symbols beginning with capital letters.
Let us illustrate the ideas underlying the treatment of atomic formulas in Abella by
considering a definition of an “append” relation. To begin with, let int and ilist be atomic
types, and let nil : ilist and cons : int→ ilist→ ilist be two constants that we use to construct
representations of lists of objects of type int. Then we might denote the append relation
using the constant
app : ilist→ ilist→ ilist→ prop
that is defined by the definitional clauses
app nil L L , ⊤ app (cons X L1) L2 (cons X L3) , app L1 L2 L3
One use for these clauses is to prove when the append relation holds. As an example, consider
the assertion
app (cons 1 nil) (cons 2 nil) (cons 1 (cons 2 nil)).
This assertion is true if app is a predicate that is defined by the clauses shown above. To
actually construct a proof, we would match the formula with the head of the second clause
and “unfold” it into the corresponding body that would then be proved by matching it with
the first clause. This process is similar in spirit to the one used to construct proofs in the
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context of the HOHH logic that we saw in Chapter 2. The difference between how clauses
are interpreted in Abella and in the HOHH logic shows up in the case where we have the
append relation appearing as an assumption in proofs we want to construct. As an example
of this kind, consider the assertion
app (cons 1 nil) (cons 2 nil) nil ⊃ ⊥.
In this case, we would want to show that if we assume app (cons 1 nil) (cons 2 nil) nil is
true, then ⊥ follows. Here we make crucial use of the fact that an append assumption can
be true only because of one of the clauses defining app. This leads to a case analysis style
of reasoning. We note in this case that neither of the clauses for app could match with the
assumption we are claiming to be true and hence any conclusion, including ⊥, follows from
it. Thus the assertion under consideration has a proof in Abella.
Atomic formulas that are defined via fixed-point definitions can also be reasoned about
inductively in Abella. This style of reasoning applies when we want to prove a formula of
the form
∀x¯.F1 ⊃ ... ⊃ A ⊃ ... ⊃ Fn ⊃ F0,
where A is defined by a fixed-point definition. Deciding that we want to prove this formula
by induction on A gives us the inductive hypothesis
∀x¯.F1 ⊃ ... ⊃ A
∗ ⊃ ... ⊃ Fn ⊃ F0
and it transforms the formula we want to prove into
∀x¯.F1 ⊃ ... ⊃ A
@ ⊃ ... ⊃ Fn ⊃ F0.
The meaning of the @ and ∗ annotations is to be understood as follows: A formula with
an @ annotation is considered “larger than” a formula with a ∗ annotation but unfolding
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the former using a definitional clause yields formulas with the ∗ annotation. Thus, such a
formula can match with the one in the induction hypothesis, that is, this hypothesis can be
used with the formula after it has been unfolded.
The induction principle that we have described above is quite powerful and can be used
to prove a number of properties concerning predicates described by fixed-point definitions.
As an example, consider the following formula that says that app is functional in its behavior:
∀l1∀l2∀l3∀l4.app l1 l2 l3 ⊃ app l1 l2 l4 ⊃ l3 = l4.
If we try to prove this by only case analysis on the first or the second assumption in this
formula, we will get stuck in a cycle: the second case in the definition of app will lead us back
to trying to prove a formula that has the same structure as the given one. This situation
reflects the fact that, in the general case, we do not know the length of the list l1 and hence
are stuck with proving the same formula, even if only for a shorter list. However, if we
are able to reason inductively on the definition of app, we are able to capture the effect of
assuming that the formula we want to prove is true when the list l1 is of shorter length, and
the proof then goes through.
The treatment of atomic formulas has the consequence of giving universal quantifiers an
extensional interpretation. To see this, suppose our definition is comprised of the following
clauses
p a , ⊤ q a , ⊤ q b , ⊤
and then consider the assertion ∀x.(p x) ⊃ (q x). This formula is provable, but the reason
for this is that the only thing of which p is true, a, is such that q is also true of it. While
this kind of quantification is often useful, sometimes we also want to be able to show that
a given formula has a generic proof, that is, the formula is true for the same reason for
each instance. To provide the ability to capture this notion, the logic underlying Abella
includes a new kind of quantifier, called a nabla quantifier. This quantifier is denoted by
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the symbol ∇τ : (τ → prop) → prop that is pronounced “nabla”; as with ∀ and ∃, we drop
types and also use a more suggestive “quantifier” notation when writing the ∇ quantifier
in formulas. Now, to prove a ∇-quantified formula, we need to introduce a new constant
called a nominal constant and then try to prove the resulting instance. A key aspect about
nominal constants is that their structure is fixed; they cannot be further elaborated in the
course of constructing a proof. Thus, the proof we construct for formulas involving the nabla
quantifier has a generic structure of the kind desired.
4.2 Constructing Proofs
Abella is used by issuing commands and using tactics. To create a fixed-point definition,
the Define command is used. This takes a name for the fixed-point definition, along with
its type, and is followed by the semicolon-separated definitional clauses. If the body of a
definitional clause is simply ⊤, it may be omitted. As an example, the app predicate defined
in the previous section would be encoded as
Define app : ilist -> ilist -> ilist -> prop by
app nil L L;
app (cons X L1) L2 (cons X L3) := app L1 L2 L3.
To start a proof, we declare a theorem using the Theorem command, which takes a name
and the formula for the theorem. For example, suppose that we want to declare and prove the
theorem about the functional nature of append that we considered in the previous section.
We would get started on this by using the following declaration in Abella:
Theorem appFun : forall l1 l2 l3 l4,
app l1 l2 l3 -> app l1 l2 l4 -> l3 = l4.
Once we have declared a theorem, proving it becomes a goal. Goals of this kind are pre-
sented as proof states by Abella. A proof state consists of a collection of eigenvariables that
represent universal quantifiers at the level of a proof, a set of assumptions, and a formula
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that must be shown to be true in the context of the assumptions. For example, after the
theorem declaration above, Abella will show us the following:
============================
forall l1 l2 l3 l4, app l1 l2 l3 -> app l1 l2 l4 -> l3 = l4
appFun <
Generally, the eigenvariables and assumptions are shown above the line and the formula
to be proven, the goal formula of the proof state, appears below. When we try to solve a
particular goal, this may spawn multiple subgoals, each of which will be represented by a
corresponding proof state. Abella will show us only the first of these proof states in full
detail; it will hold the others for consideration after we have finished solving the subgoal
that is currently in focus.
To progress in the solution of a goal in this context, we use tactics. One example of a
tactic is that for using induction in the form that we described it in the previous section. To
construct a proof by induction on the ith premise in an implicational formula, we invoke this
tactic through a command of the form induction on i. For example, in the proof state
shown above, we could invoke it as follows, leading to the new proof state that is shown
immediately after:
appFun < induction on 1.
IH : forall l1 l2 l3 l4, app l1 l2 l3 * -> app l1 l2 l4 -> l3 = l4
============================
forall l1 l2 l3 l4, app l1 l2 l3 @ -> app l1 l2 l4 -> l3 = l4
appFun <
Note that the hypotheses are identified by labels—the induction hypothesis here has been
given the label IH. This is done so as to enable us to name the particular hypotheses that
we may want to use in applying further tactics.
Continuing with our example, we might now want to simplify the goal formula of the
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proof state using rules for introducing implications and universal quantifiers. To do this we
would invoke the intros tactic, which leads to the following proof state:
Variables: l1 l2 l3 l4
IH : forall l1 l2 l3 l4, app l1 l2 l3 * -> app l1 l2 l4 -> l3 = l4
H1 : app l1 l2 l3 @
H2 : app l1 l2 l4
============================
l3 = l4
appFun <
All four universally-quantified variables were replaced by eigenvariables, and these are shown
at the top of the proof state. We also have the assumptions about the relations of appending
lists l1 and l2. Note that H1 has the @ annotation to mark it as a larger version than is
compatible with the inductive hypothesis.
The next step in completing the proof would be to do a case analysis on one of the
newly introduced goals. This is done using the case tactic that takes as an argument an
assumption formula, indicated by its label:
appFun < case H1.
Subgoal 1:
Variables: l3 l4
IH : forall l1 l2 l3 l4, app l1 l2 l3 * -> app l1 l2 l4 -> l3 = l4
H2 : app nil l3 l4
============================
l3 = l4
Subgoal 2 is:
cons X L3 = l4
appFun <
Observe that case analysis has resulted in two subgoals here, only one of which is shown
explicitly. This first subgoal can be solved easily by using case analysis again on the as-
sumption H2; this assumption can be true only because of the first clause in the definition
of app, leading to the conclusion that l3 and l4 must be equal in this case.
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This leaves us with having to solve the second subgoal. Using case analysis on the second
app hypothesis leaves us in the following state:
Subgoal 2:
Variables: l2 L3 X L1 L5
IH : forall l1 l2 l3 l4, app l1 l2 l3 * -> app l1 l2 l4 -> l3 = l4
H3 : app L1 l2 L3 *
H4 : app L1 l2 L5
============================
cons X L3 = cons X L5
appFun <
To complete this proof, we have to “apply” the induction hypothesis to the other two as-
sumptions. Abella provides an apply tactic for this purpose. To use this tactic, we have to
identify a formula to be applied and the formula or formulas that it should be applied to.
These formulas can be hypotheses in the proof state or previously proven theorems. In the
present context, we can invoke it as follows with the indicated result:
appFun < apply IH to H3 H4.
Subgoal 2:
Variables: L2 X L5 L9
IH : forall L1 L2 L3 L4, app L1 L2 L3 * -> app L1 L2 L4 -> L3 = L4
H3 : app L5 l2 L9 *
H4 : app L5 l2 L9
============================
cons X L9 = cons X L9
appFun <
The new proof state has a trivial proof since the goal formula asserts equality between
identical terms. Abella provides a search tactic that can be invoked to try and complete
proofs that can be found with the application of a few simple steps. This tactic can be used
as the last step in this case.
Once all the subgoals have been proven, the proof is completed, and the theorem can be
used in future developments.
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We have provided an exposure to some of the tactics available with Abella through the
example we have considered. These are not the only tactics available, but they cover the
ones we will use in the proofs we consider in this thesis with one exception. Some of the
theorems we will want to prove will require the use of mutual induction. In such a case, we
will want to prove a conjunction of formulas. To do this, the induction tactic allows us to
identify a formula to do induction on in each of the conjuncts. Subsequently, we may invoke
the split tactic to break up the task into the subgoals of proving each of the conjuncts
separately. Once a theorem that is a conjunction of formulas has been proven this way, we
can use the top-level command Split to separate the conjuncts into separate theorems that
can be used individually.
A more complete exposition of Abella may be found in [1].
4.3 The Encoding of HOHH in Abella
Since the language of Abella is the same as that of the HOHH logic, formulas of HOHH
can be written more or less directly as Abella formulas. We can then encode the two kinds
of sequents in HOHH using the predicates seq : olist → o → prop and foc : olist → o →
o→ prop; the intention is that the first predicate should be defined so as to be true exactly
when it corresponds to a normal kind of sequent that is derivable in the HOHH logic and
the second should be defined so that it is true when the corresponding focused sequent is
derivable. Note that the type olist corresponds to lists of formulas in both cases, the last
argument represents the formula on the righthand side of a sequent and the middle argument
in the case of foc corresponds to the focus formula.
Figure 4.1 presents definitions in Abella for the two predicates that implement their
intended meanings. The clauses in this figure are more or less transparent renditions of the
inference rules for HOHH. One thing to note is that ∇ is used to encode the ΠR rule. This
is because the interpretation of Π in the HOHH logic is that of a generic quantifier rather
31
seq L ⊤ , ⊤
seq L (F ⇒ G) , seq (F :: L) G
seq L (G1 & G2) , seq L G1 ∧ seq L G2
seq L (Πx : τ.(F x)) , ∇x : τ.seq L (F x)
seq L A , atom A ∧member F L ∧ foc L F A
foc L (G⇒ F ) A , seq L G ∧ foc L F A
foc L (Πx : τ.(F x)) A , ∃t : τ.foc L (F t) A
foc L A A , ⊤
Figure 4.1: Encoding of inference rules of HOHH into the logic of Abella as fixed-point definitions. In the
clause for foc L (F1 & F2) A, i is either 1 or 2.
than that of the universal quantifier in Abella. Perhaps the only things to be explained are
the predicates atom and member in the last clause for seq. The first predicate has the type
o→ prop and is supposed to recognize the encodings of atomic HOHH formulas. The second
predicate checks for the membership of a formula in a list of formulas. Both predicates can
be defined in Abella.
The encoding that we have described is, in fact, built into Abella to give it the ability
to reason about HOHH specifications. Abella also has a special syntax for the encodings
of the two forms of HOHH sequents that we shall use. A “goal-reduction” sequent of the
form seq L G is written as {L ⊢ G}. Backchaining sequents of the form foc L F G are
written as {L, [F ] ⊢ G}. When writing sequents using this notation, if we wish to explicitly
list several members of the context, we shall include them in sequence, possibly after a
schematic variable denoting the rest of the list of assumptions as we see in the following
example: {L, p, q ⊢ G}. In the case that the assumption list is empty, the representation of
goal-reduction sequents is simplified to {G}.
4.4 Reasoning About HOHH Specifications
Once we have specified a rule-based system in HOHH, we can reason about that specification
in Abella. This is done in the same way as reasoning about definitions created directly in
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Abella, since the rules of HOHH are encoded as a fixed-point definition. Then we are able
to work with them just as with any other definition.
As an example, we show that appending two lists is deterministic using the rules for
appending lists written in HOHH in Section 2.2,
append nil L L append L1 L2 L3 ⇒ append (cons X L1) L2 (cons X L3)
We can write a theorem app determ to show that append is deterministic:
∀L1∀L2∀L3∀L4.{append L1 L2 L3} ⊃ {append L1 L2 L4} ⊃ L3 = L4
The meaning of this theorem is that if we have a derivation of append L1 L2 L3 in HOHH
in the context of the given rules for append and a derivation of append L1 L2 L4 in the same
context, then the two lists L3 and L4 must, in fact, be the same list. We prove this by
induction on the first sequent. The induction tactic creates an inductive hypothesis
∀L1∀L2∀L3∀L4.{append L1 L2 L3}
∗ ⊃ {append L1 L2 L4} ⊃ L3 = L4
Note the annotation on the first append sequent, marking it to only be used by a strictly
smaller instance of a hypothesis matching it. A strictly smaller instance of a sequent is
actually a shorter derivation of a similar goal formula, rather than directly referring to using
append on a shorter list, since we are reasoning about the HOHH derivation rather than the
append relation itself.
By application of the intros tactic we get the hypotheses H1 : {append L1 L2 L3}
@ and
H2 : {append L1 L2 L4}, as well as adding the eigenvariables L1, L2, L3, and L4 into the
context, and the conclusion we wish to reach is now reduced to L3 = L4. We analyze the
possible cases for H1 using the case tactic. The cases of this are the inference rules that
could have been used to prove it. Since the goal is atomic, the cases are the formulas that
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may be focused on and used, which are the two formulas for append, app-nil and app-cons.
If H1 holds by focusing on the app-nil rule, L1 must be nil and L2 = L3. There is no shorter
derivation involved with this, since it is solved by init, so we get no new hypotheses. Then,
by using the equality of L2 and L3, H2 is automatically transformed to {append nil L3 L4}.
Doing case analysis on this hypothesis, since only the app-nil rule can be focused on, shows
that L3 = L4, finishing the subgoal.
Alternatively, if H1 holds by focusing on and using the app-cons rule for backchaining,
the list L1 must be the result of constructing a list from a list element X and a shorter
list L′1. Then L3 = X :: L
′
3, for some L
′
3, to match the app-cons rule. H1 is replaced by
H3 : {append L′1 L2 L
′
3}
∗, since focusing on app-cons in a derivation leads to having to show
that the antecedent of the clause holds as well, and then we may assume that this antecedent
holds when the formula has been successfully used in a derivation. Note that the annotation
on H3 marks it as a shorter derivation which can be used with the inductive hypothesis. The
hypothesis H2 is transformed to {append (X :: L′1) L2 L4}. Carrying out case analysis on
this, we can only backchain on app-cons since the first list is non-empty, and this tells us
that L4 = X :: L
′
4, for some list L
′
4, creating the new hypothesis H4 : {append L
′
1 L2 L
′
4}.
The inductive hypothesis can be applied to H4 and H5, which shows that L′3 = L
′
4. Since our
goal is X :: L′3 = X :: L
′
4, this result leads to our goal being rewritten as X :: L
′
4 = X :: L
′
4,
and it can be solved with the search tactic. Since this was the last subgoal, the proof is
completed and app determ is added as a theorem that can be applied in future proofs.
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Chapter 5
Proving Strengthening Lemmas
This chapter describes how strengthening lemmas are proven in Abella. As we have seen in
Chapter 2, the dynamic context can grow when we are trying to construct a proof for a goal
formula in the HOHH logic. For this reason, we have to first generalize the strengthening
lemma to take into account the different forms the dynamic context can have. A second
aspect to pay attention to is that the proof of a particular goal formula may depend on the
provability of additional goal formulas—these are the “subgoals” that arise in constructing
a proof in the HOHH logic. Thus, we may have to prove additional strengthening lemmas
for these other goal formulas and all these proofs will have to be constructed simultaneously
using mutual induction.
In Chapter 3 we have examined how we can determine if a strengthening lemma actually
holds. The information we calculated there provides us a means for determining the structure
of the dynamic contexts and the goals that arise in the course of a proof. In this chapter
we describe how this information can be converted into a form from which an explicit proof
can be generated for a given strengthening lemma in Abella. In the first section below, we
consider the construction of definitions for the dynamic contexts. We then describe how to
generate a strengthened form of the strengthening lemma. The last two sections consider
in turn the automatic generation of a proof in Abella for the stronger theorem and the
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incorporation of these ideas in the form of a new tactic in Abella for automating the proof
of strengthening lemmas.
5.1 Formalizing Dynamic Contexts
To start, the formulas that may dynamically appear in the contexts of each of the predicates
are calculated, as discussed in Section 3.1. The dynamic context of a predicate is then
defined by a fixed-point definition in the logic of Abella defining a list that either contains
nothing, or contains only the formulas from the dynamic context of the predicate. Then
it has definitional clauses for nil and for each formula of the dynamic context. The rest of
this work will assume that the dynamic context predicate for a predicate p is named ctx p.
If the dynamic context of a predicate p may contain formulas F1, ..., Fn, then we have the
definitional clauses
ctx p nil , ⊤ ctx p (F1 :: L) , ctx p L ... ctx p (Fn :: L) , ctx p L
Such a definition is created for the dynamic context of each predicate the goal that is being
strengthened depends on, as calculated by the algorithm discussed in Section 3.2.
To assist in the proof of the strengthening lemma, a lemma is created and proven that
shows if a list is of the form of the dynamic context for some predicate, then a member of
it must be one of a limited number of forms, specifically the formulas that might occur in
the dynamic context of that predicate. We refer to this as a context membership lemma,
and assume the name of the context membership lemma for a predicate p is ctx p mem. If
there are no formulas that may appear in the dynamic context, it is asserted that having a
member of such a list leads to a contradiction. Then the theorem for the predicate p is of
the form
∀E∀L.ctx p L ⊃ member E L ⊃ ∃x¯1.E = F1 ∨ ... ∨ ∃x¯n.E = Fn
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induction on 1. intros. case H1.
case H2.
for i = 1..n
case H2. search.
apply IH to H3 H4. search.
end for
Figure 5.1: A structure for the proof of the context membership lemma for a predicate p. The assumption
is that the dynamic context of p contains n formulas where n ≥ 0.
where the dynamic context of p may contain the formulas F1, ..., Fn and x¯i contains the
variables in Fi.
Figure 5.1 shows the form for the proof of the context membership lemmas that are
generated; we mean the for loop here to be read as a means for showing the (static) repetition
of the tactic invocations in the body of the loop and not as a higher-order form of tactic
that can be invoked dynamically. The structure of the proof that is constructed can be
understood as follows: To prove this formula, we carry out induction on the fixed-point
definition of the context. After declaring our induction and introducing the hypotheses, we
have eigenvariables E and L and hypotheses H1 : ctx p L and H2 : member E nil, and our goal
is ∃x¯1.E = F1∨ ...∨∃x¯n.E = Fn. We carry out case analysis on the hypothesis corresponding
to our induction (case H1). After this, we have the single hypothesis H2 remaining. Since
it is not possible to have a member of an empty list, case analysis on this solves the current
subgoal. Then, for each formula Fi that can appear in the dynamic context, we have two
hypotheses,
H2 : member E (Fi :: L)
H3 : ctx p L
and the same goal as before. Case analysis on H2 gives us that E = Fi, and so search will
solve this subgoal. The next subgoal is to show that, if E is in the rest of the list rather
than being the first element, it is also one of the formulas of the dynamic context. This is
done by application of the inductive hypothesis. Carrying this out for all formulas that may
be in the dynamic context solves all subgoals, completing the proof.
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induction on 1. intros. case H1.
search.
for i = 1..n
apply IH to H2. search.
end for
Figure 5.2: Structure of the proof for proving the subcontext relationship where the dynamic context of a is
a subset of the dynamic context of b, where a’s dynamic context contains n formulas with n ≥ 0.
For each pair of predicates (a, b), where a depends on b, a subcontext lemma is generated.
This will simplify the proof of the strengthening lemma. Since all the formulas that may occur
in a’s dynamic context also occur in b’s dynamic context, it is the case that an instance of a’s
dynamic context is also an instance of b’s dynamic context. Then the subcontext theorem is
∀L.ctx a L ⊃ ctx b L
Hereafter we shall assume the subcontext theorem as stated above is named ctx a subctx ctx b.
The proof structure for subcontext lemmas is found in Figure 5.2. The proof is done by
induction on the assumption that the list is of the form of an instance of a’s dynamic context.
The intros tactic introduces this as an assumption H1, leaving the goal ctx b L, and case
analysis on H1 allows us to go through each possible form of the list. The first possibility
is the empty list, which is solved simply by using the search tactic, since the goal becomes
ctx b nil, and ctx b is also defined to fit the empty list. As before, the for loop represents
repetition of the body rather than a tactic. For each subsequent formula Fi, the goal formula
is ctx b (Fi :: L), with the single hypothesis H2 : ctx a L
∗. Applying the inductive hypothesis
shows that it is also the case that L is an instance of ctx b. With this information, search is
able to find the definitional clause for such a list for ctx b and finish the proof of the subgoal.
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5.2 Generation of Strengthening Lemmas
To strengthen a formula G from its dependence on a formula F , it must be shown that, for
every situation that may arise in proving G, F cannot be used. It must be further shown
for each goal that may arise, no matter which formulas are in its dynamic context, F cannot
be used; that is, to strengthen G, we must strengthen not only G but also all the predicates
its head predicate depends on from F . These cannot be carried out entirely separately in all
cases, however; in some cases they must be carried out through mutual induction for all the
predicates G depends on. This allows an inductive hypothesis to be used to show, when a
goal P , where Hp(P ) = p, backchains to create a goal Q, where Hp(Q) = q, that F will still
not be used in the proof of Q, and so will not be used in the proof of P . If q does not depend
on p, then proving the strengthening lemma for q first and simply using it in the proof of
the strengthening lemma for p will work; however, it is possible for them to be mutually
dependent. Then neither one can be proven without appealing to the strengthening of the
other one. This is the kind of situation which requires that the proof be made with mutual
induction. It is also possible to have larger loops of dependence, such as having p depend on
q, which depends on r, and r depends on p again. In this case as well, none of the predicates’
strengthening lemmas can be proven without appealing to another’s.
Each predicate may have a different set of formulas that can appear in its dynamic
context. Then for each predicate we show its strengthening from its own dynamic context.
The possibility must be considered that a formula that appears in the dynamic context
might be used in the proof, and that this might lead to using the formula that is being
strengthened from. We cannot use one context that contains all formulas that may arise in
the dynamic contexts of all predicates being strengthened either, without the possibility of
severely limiting the strengthening lemmas that may be proven. Consider the case where we
have two predicates p and q, where q’s dynamic context contains F ⇒ p, but this formula
does not appear in p’s dynamic context. Then using one overarching context definition would
lead to this being available when proving p, and so it would appear F could be used in the
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proof of p when it actually could not. If there are no formulas like this that would interfere
with the ability to prove strengthening, then having a single context would work; however,
this is not the general case, and so we use separate dynamic context definitions for each
predicate.
The form of a strengthening lemma for a predicate p where we are strengthening from a
formula F is
∀L∀x¯.ctx p L ⊃ {L, F ⊢ G} ⊃ {L ⊢ G}
where Hp(G) = p and x¯ contains all universally-quantified variables that appear in F and
G. Proving this shows that having a proof of G from a list L representing an instance of
the dynamic context of p and a formula F means that a proof of G can also be derived
from L alone. If we have a set of predicates p1, ..., pn to strengthen from F , we write the
mutually-inductive strengthening lemma as the conjunction of the separate strengthening
lemmas for all the predicates:
(∀L∀x¯1.ctx p1 L ⊃ {L, F ⊢ G1} ⊃ {L ⊢ G1}) ∧ ...
∧(∀L∀x¯n.ctx pn L ⊃ {L, F ⊢ Gn} ⊃ {L ⊢ Gn})
where Hp(Gi) = pi.
5.3 Generating Proofs for the Strengthening Lemmas
Once the mutually-inductive strengthening lemma has been generated, it can be automati-
cally proven. We assume that the formula we wish to strengthen from is F , and that the goal
formula we ultimately wish to strengthen depends on predicates a1, ..., an. For each predi-
cate ai we create a goal formula for the predicate by creating universally-quantified variables
for each of its arguments. We call the goal formula created in this way Ai. The structure
of the proof for the mutually-inductive strengthening lemma for these predicates is found
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induction on 2∗n.
if n ≥ 2 then
split.
end if
for i = 1..n
intros. case H2.
for D = (Πx¯.(G1 & ... & Gm)⇒ A) where Hp(A) = ai and D ∈ Γ
for j = 1..m
apply ctx ai subctx ctx Hp(Gj) to H1.
apply IHHp(GJ ) to H(5 + j +m) H(5 + j).
end for
search.
end for
case H4. case H3.
apply ctx ai mem to H1 H5.
// dynamic context of ai = {D1, ..., Dp}
if p > 1 then
case H6.
end if
for j = 1..p
// Dj = (Πx¯.(G1 & ... & Gm)⇒ A)
case H3.
if Hp(A) = ai then
for k = 1..m
apply ctx ai subctx ctx Hp(Gk) to H1.
apply IHHp(Gk) to H(5 + k +m) H(5 + k).
end for
search.
end if
end for
end for
Figure 5.3: Structure of the proof for the mutually-inductive strengthening lemma for a set of predicate
dependencies {a1, ..., an}. In the first line 2∗n means n digit 2’s.
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in Figure 5.3. This proof is done by induction on the unstrengthened derivations for each
predicate. We refer to the inductive hypothesis for the predicate ai as IHai . Each predicate
ai’s strengthening is proven separately, with the separation done by using the split tactic if
we have more than one predicate. For each predicate, we use the intros tactic to introduce
eigenvariables and create hypotheses
H1 : ctx ai L
H2 : {L, F ⊢ Ai}
which leaves us with the goal {L ⊢ Ai}. We carry out case analysis on H2, which considers
the cases for how H2 holds, whether by backchaining on a formula from the static context
or the dynamic context.
We start by iterating over the static context to find program clauses that might be
used as the last step in the derivation of Ai. Any program clause D where Hp(D) 6= ai is
automatically skipped as it is not possible for it to be used as the last step of the derivation
of Ai in the inference rules of HOHH. For any program clause with the head predicate ai,
we backchain, which creates assumptions for the derivations of all the antecedents, each of
which has the form {L, F ⊢ Gj}
∗. For each of these antecedents, the appropriate subcontext
lemma is applied to show that the current dynamic context is also an instance of the dynamic
context for Hp(Gj), and then the inductive hypothesis for Hp(Gj) can be used to show that
all derivations do not use the formula being strengthened from. This gives us a hypothesis
{L ⊢ Gj}. Once this is done for all the antecedents, the search tactic will finish proving
that, when backchaining on the current program clause, the derivation does not use the
formula being strengthened from.
Once this has been done for every program clause, the proof moves on to attempting to
use the dynamic context to backchain on, which includes both the formula being strengthened
from and the defined dynamic context. Then we have the following hypotheses:
H1 : ctx ai L
H3 : {L, F, [E] ⊢ Ai}
∗
H4 : member E (F :: L)
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We do case analysis on H4, which gives us subgoals for showing {L ⊢ Ai} in the cases where
E = F and where E is a member of the rest of L. The case where E = F is solved by
case analysis on H3, since F cannot be instantiated to match Ai. The context membership
lemma for ai is then used to get the cases for membership in the rest of the list, and the
application of this lemma creates a new hypothesis. If there are multiple formulas that may
appear in the dynamic context, case analysis is done on this hypothesis, and a subgoal is
generated for each formula that may be a member of the dynamic context.
Iterating through these formulas is very similar to iterating through the static context
formulas. If a formula cannot be used to directly solve the current goal, doing case analysis on
H3, the unstrengthened derivation hypothesis, will immediately solve the goal. If the current
formula can be used to solve the current goal, it is backchained on and we get hypotheses for
each of the antecedents. As before, we use the appropriate subcontext lemma and inductive
hypothesis for each, then the search tactic at the end to finish the proof for the current
dynamic context formula.
Once all the subgoals for the dynamic context formulas are finished, we move on to the
strengthening lemma for the next predicate and repeat the process. After the portion of the
proof for the dynamic context of the last predicate is finished, the whole mutually-inductive
strengthening lemma has been proven and can be split and used in further developments.
5.4 A Tactic for Proving Strengthening Lemmas
Using the automatic generation of proofs of strengthening lemmas discussed in the previous
section, a tactic to automatically prove strengthening has been implemented in Abella. To
use this tactic, a user creates a fixed-point definition for a predicate defining a context
containing formulas F1, ..., Fn, where n ≥ 0. The user then declares a theorem in the form
of a strengthening lemma using this context, which has the form
∀L∀x¯.ctx L ⊃ {L, F ⊢ G} ⊃ {L ⊢ G}
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where F is the formula to be strengthened from, x¯ contains any quantified variables found in
F and G, and the name of the defined context is ctx. After this, he invokes the strengthen
tactic.
The strengthen tactic adds the formulas F1, ..., Fn to the static context for calculating
the dynamic contexts as discussed in Section 3.1, but also adds F1, ..., Fn to each predicate’s
dynamic context. It does the same with any antecedents of G. These need to be part of the
dynamic context for Hp(G), since they are available for use in the derivation of G. Then,
since they can be in the dynamic context of Hp(G), they must also be part of the dynamic
context for each predicate Hp(G) depends on. After the dynamic contexts are calculated, the
dependencies are calculated as well, as discussed in Section 3.2. If Hp(F ) ∈ S(Hp(G)), then
an error is thrown, since there may be a dependency between G and F , and the automated
proof of the strengthening lemma cannot succeed.
Once the dependencies are known, the dynamic context definition and associated lem-
mas discussed in Section 5.1 can be defined and proven. Using these, a mutually-inductive
strengthening lemma is created and proven, using the algorithm discussed in Section 5.3.
Once this proof is finished, a subcontext lemma is proven to show that the user-defined
context can only contain a subset of the formulas that may occur in the calculated dynamic
context of Hp(G). It can be seen that this is true, since all the formulas of the user-
defined context are included automatically in the contexts that are automatically defined to
create the mutually-inductive strengthening lemma. After being proven, the automatically-
generated mutually-inductive strengthening lemma is split into its separate components using
the Split command. Then the original theorem entered by the user is proven by using the
subcontext lemma for the user-created context definition and applying the split strengthen-
ing lemma, with this proof shown in Figure 5.4.
It is necessary to run these proofs rather than just assume that strengthening holds
when Hp(G) does not depend on Hp(F ) in order to reduce the trusted code base of the
proof assistant. If we trusted that the dependency calculations are correct, then an error
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intros.
apply ctx subctx ctx Hp(G).
apply split strengthening lemma
to H3 H2.
search.
Figure 5.4: Proof of the user-entered strengthening theorem, where ctx is the name of the user-defined
context, G is the goal to be strengthened, and split strengthening lemma refers to the portion of the mutually-
inductive strengthening lemma for the predicate Hp(G).
in them could invalidate any development using the strengthen tactic. By running the
proofs explicitly, only the other, lower-level tactics are trusted code, as is the case in the
proof assistant in general. By keeping the trusted code base as small as possible, the proof
assistant is more trustworthy, as the small trusted code base can be more easily verified than
a larger code base could be.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has shown how strengthening lemmas can be automatically generated and proven
in the Abella Proof Assistant. This is done by carrying out a reachability analysis to de-
termine which types of formulas can arise in the derivation of a given goal. The analysis
can then be used to generate strengthening lemmas and explicit proofs of them. It further
describes how automatically generating and proving strengthening lemmas can be used to
implement a strengthen tactic that allows a user to create a simple strengthening lemma
and have the more complex background work and proof done for him.
The work in this thesis can be extended in several ways. We describe two particular
directions that look especially promising and that we intend to explore in the future. In
the first direction, we would like to consider applications for the strengthening lemmas
whose proofs we have provided a means for automating. The immediate motivation for
considering these lemmas is that they enable the discovery that terms of a particular type
could not contain terms of another type, leading thereby to the pruning of some branches
in a case analysis over equality assumptions. Now that we have a means for proving these
lemmas automatically, we would like to see how the process of using them in the manner
we have described can also be automated. The second avenue for future work concerns
the development of an algorithm that provides a more careful analysis of dependencies and
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thereby enables the validation of more strengthening lemmas. Specifically, we have described
in Section 3.3 how the current algorithm misses some cases and we have also explained how
it might be modified to do better in these cases. We intend to both articulate an improved
analysis based on these ideas and also to evaluate whether the additional strengthening
lemmas it allows us to prove are an adequate compensation for the more complex form to
the generated proofs.
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